British intelligence in Ireland between 1919 and 1921 has been characterized as a toxic mix of incompetence and mendacity. This article will challenge this judgement by examining the activities, impact and consequences of a British civil servant, Alfred Cope, who between 1920 and 1921 was an Assistant Under Secretary in Dublin Castle. Using the three criteria of counter-intelligence operations: the ability to locate, identify and neutralize a target, it will be shown that within months of his posting to Dublin British intelligence, albeit inadvertently, had located and identified him as passing classified information to Sinn Fein. Political patronage meant the ability of the intelligence community to neutralize his impact was nugatory. Latterly Cope recognized the consequences of his actions reverberated beyond the period of his time in Ireland.
Introduction
These epigraphs illustrate the personality and actions of the Englishman Alfred 'Andy' Cope who, between 1920 and 1922, was Assistant Under Secretary in Dublin Castle, with specific responsibility for administration of the Royal Irish Constabulary. During this period the United Kingdom was fighting an insurgency inside its borders. Foot, in the Dictionary of National Biography, 4 suggested the nature of Cope's relationship to the leaders of this insurgency:
In a later version of the Dictionary of National Biography O'Halpin conveys a sense of the commitment Cope brought to this task and the interest he attracted from the British intelligence community in Ireland: 'he did this with zest, courage and initiative, on occasion having to shake off British intelligence agents as he travelled to clandestine meetings' . 7 Hopkinson has endorsed these judgements. 8 Cope's activities are critical to understand as they explain the political outcome of the insurgency. However, until now they have been hampered by a lack of empirical evidence: 'The secretive character of Cope's work and the absence of personal papers make him a tantalisingly enigmatic figure' . 9 The diaries of Mark Sturgis 10 provide only a partial understanding. Cope's role is addressed by framing the evidence of these activities, between May 1920 and the October 1922, with a counter-intelligence analysis. Dulles defined counter-intelligence as 'inherently a protective and defensive operation. Its primary purpose is to thwart espionage against one's country, but it may also be extremely useful in uncovering hostile penetration and subversive plots' . 11 The perennial aspects of counter-intelligence are to 'locate, identify and neutralize' . Zuehlke argued that there was an essential feature to any counter-intelligence activity: specifically, 'counter-intelligence information' 12 which references the process of 'gathering, compiling, analyzing, and using CI information to support the countering operation' . 13 These concepts provide a way of understanding Cope's activities between 1920 and 1921. They will also enable a number of questions to be successfully addressed. Did his relationship with the leaders of the insurgency facilitate a government decision to progressively grant de facto legal immunity to these leaders? Was Cope responsible for systematically passing confidential information to the IRA, including secret communication ciphers that endangered members of the Royal Irish Constabulary and undermined the effectiveness of their operations? A first step to address these questions will be an assessment of the existing intelligence organisations and the new intelligence organisations set up in Ireland from 1920 onwards.
How do we judge the effectiveness of the intelligence organisations during this period? Kent interpreted intelligence as both 'a process and an end-product' . He argued that intelligence organisations perform two functions: the surveillance operation, by which I mean the many ways by which the contemporary world is put under close and systematic observation, and the research operation. By the latter I mean the attempts to establish meaningful patterns out of what was observed in the past and attempts to get meaning out of what appears to be going on now. 14 One of the accepted judgements about this period is that the intelligence organisations of the British state were incapable of performing these two functions: 'Neither the Army nor the police were able to build the essential foundation for success in guerrilla warfare, a dependable intelligence service.
provided a less generous judgement of Cope: 'He was persona grata with the leaders of the rebellion, in whom he had a belief that was pathetic as, in my opinion, it was misplaced' . 21 These conflicting perspectives need to be understood in the context of the insurgency the British state was fighting. O'Neill has defined it as, a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the non-ruling group consciously used political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. 22 Not surprisingly this definition omits any reference to the key role that intelligence organisations play in sustaining legitimacy.
In 1919 Ireland had two police forces: the Dublin Metropolitan Police and the Royal Irish Constabulary. They both contained an intelligence capability, 'G' Division and the Crimes Special Branch, respectively. They were an early target of the insurgents. A series of murders resulted in the establishment of new all-Ireland intelligence institutions to compensate for an intelligence deficit; second, the gradual involvement of the British Army in supporting the two police forces and the development of its own intelligence gathering structures that could both process intelligence and produce an end product. This article will not examine the British Army's intelligence structures in any detail except when they enable a better understanding of Cope's activities. 
Context and the need for intelligence
On 21 January 1919, in Dublin's Mansion House, an extreme nationalist organization -Sinn Feinunilaterally declared independence. 24 The Times commented: 'The whole thing is, of course, childishly illegal' .
25
. The declaration was legitimated with an assertion of illegitimacy: 'Whereas English rule in this country is, and always has been, based on force and fraud and maintained by military occupation against the declared will of the people' . 26 The declaration also delivered a message to the 'Free nations of the World' and viewed geography as destiny: 'Her independence is demanded by the Freedom of the Seas: her harbours are empty and idle solely because English policy is determined to retain Ireland as a barren bulwark for English aggrandisement' .
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The structure of this insurgent organization can be gauged by the roles occupied by Michael Collins:
Being at the same time Minister of Finance responsible to the Dail, Director of Organization and, from June 1919, Director of Intelligence on the Executive of the Irish Volunteers, and finally President of the Supreme Council of the IRB, with notional leadership of the whole movement. 28 The centre of gravity of the insurgency was Dublin and, to lesser extent, Cork. The departments of the Dail were located in the former, and also the GHQ of the Irish Volunteers. These organisations functioned in backrooms, hidden offices, and were dependent on the movement of documents from one secret location to another.
Collins had learnt from the 1916 rebellion how important intelligence was. He had witnessed how the detectives of 'G' Division walked through a group of two thousand prisoners sitting on the floor of the gymnasium of Richmond barracks in Dublin and identified those who would be subsequently charged under the Defence of the Realm Act. 29 Every insurgency needs an enemy 30 and initially Sinn Fein targeted the part of G division of the Dublin Metropolitan Police responsible for the detection of political crime. The Irish Volunteers had already recruited three junior members of 'G' division, who were acting as inside agents.
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The period from April to September saw an increase in tempo of violence and intimidation. Sinn Fein designated the RIC as a target and initiated a boycott. This was not without problems for the IRA:
The mere fact that these men were rather decent men in peaceful times made them all the more a menace when the national resurgence burst forth, and it took some time and some exhortation to convince local people that the RIC were really enemies. 32 The attacks on the RIC were designed to eliminate a specific intelligence capability. Outside Dublin the RIC performed a unique function:
A particular menace to the Volunteers was the small area, policed by one sergeant and five constables. The police in this case knew almost everything about every native of the area, and when a prominent Volunteer officer from Dublin came to the area, although previously unknown to the police in Dublin, was soon noted by the RIC as a stranger.
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These attacks and destruction of small police stations caused serious gaps in intelligence capability. In the first three months of 1920:
Over 400 isolated police barracks were destroyed, and the Constabulary was concentrated, and immobilized, behind steel shutters in the larger buildings; and by May of that year some eighty members of the RIC and detectives in the Dublin Metropolitan Police had been murdered without any assassin being brought to justice. 34 In Dublin between July and September two of 'G' division's experienced detective sergeants Smyth and Hoey were murdered on Collins's orders. It was not until 12th September, that Dail Eireann was declared illegal. This meant that all the 'government departments' of Dail Eireaan and the Volunteer GHQ had to go underground throughout Dublin.
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Alfred Cope and counter-intelligence
When Alfred Cope arrived in Dublin in May 1920, two aspects of governance in Ireland had become dysfunctional. First there was a decline in social authority. General Macready identified a direct link between the 1916 rebellion and the insurgency that gathered pace after 1919. 36 Secondly there was a malaise that Colonel Foulkes 37 discerned: 'By the end of 1919 the two police forces were far from being an effective force. They then found themselves in small detachments and isolated; boycotted by Sinn Fein threatened, abused and murdered' . 38 Cope's appointment was paradoxically a product of a military appointment, in March 1920, of a new GOC for Ireland. General Shaw had been replaced by General Macready, a personal choice of the Prime Minister Lloyd George. 39 Macready had sent a series of reports stating that, 'administrative chaos seems to reign here, where the machine was hopelessly out of gear' . 40 The government asked Sir Warren Fisher, the Head of the Civil Service, to examine the functioning of Dublin Castle, the centre of British administration. Fisher arrived on 4th May with a two-man team: R.E. Harwood from the Treasury and Alfred Cope then working in the Ministry of Pensions. The main focus was the working of the office of the Chief Secretary. The report was completed on 12th May. Out of this report came a series of new appointments of which Cope's was to be but one. The new Under Secretary was Sir John Anderson, then Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue. Cope was appointed Assistant Under Secretary along with Mark Sturgis from the Treasury. 41 Anderson and his team arrived in Dublin on 22nd of May 1921. A portrait of Cope and his political preferences was given by Macready: 'a tireless worker, highly strung, a firm believer in self-government for Ireland … and feverishly anxious to do all in his power, even at the risk of his life, to ensure the success of Mr. Lloyd George's policy' . 42 For Paul Bew these appointments signalled a shift in the political preferences of the administration.
A new clique was created which governed policy. A network was instituted involving 'flexible' Irish officials like W.E. Wylie, the crown prosecutor and G.C. Duggan of Dublin Castle; above all, new English officials like Sir John Anderson and Andy Cope, now the driving force in Dublin Castle. This group worked closely with Philip Kerr in the prime minister's office. Sir Basil Thomson, at Scotland Yard and C.J. Philips, chief assistant to the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon. 43 Bew challenged the accepted judgements of Irish historians who have characterized British policy as one of incoherence. 44 He argued that there was now the ambition to negotiate with the insurgents and bring Lloyd George to it as well: 'this group had a clear picture of the settlement from the outset and a confidence in their ability to deliver, in the end, the prime minister' . 45 When General Macready arrived in April 1920 he concluded the effectiveness of 'G' Division had been blunted by what he described as 'systematic murder' , and the RIC was in a state of 'disintegration' . 46 Collins had assumed that the murder of these detectives and policemen would bring about a deficit of intelligence that could not be filled: 'even when the new spy stepped into the shoes of the old one, he could not step into the old one's knowledge' . 47 What is remarkable about this period from May 1920 to July 1921-just over 14 months -is how wrong Collins was. The British were able to build up an effective intelligence organization very quickly.
An example is illustrated by a secret memo, dated 6 August 1920, from General Macready to Sir John Anderson, the Under Secretary, which illustrates how the army had captured documents that came from the top of the Republican movement:
Brind (a staff officer at GHQ) sent to the Castle yesterday copies of some most important correspondence that we have got hold of, laying down the policy that is being carried out by our 48 Arthur Griffiths in regard to the establishment of the Republican Government.
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In June 1920 the Special Branch Dublin District was established, commanded by Lt Col Walter Wilson. 50 It compensated for the intelligence vacuum left by 'G 'Division of the DMP:
In the early summer of 1920 intelligence primacy still lay with the army, and, as a result of increasing IRA attacks on soldiers, many officers volunteered for intelligence duty. Dublin Military District's intelligence branch was reorganised and a plain clothes section known as Special Branch Dublin District created to collect military and political information in the capital.
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Its success can be judged by two criteria: material captured and arrests made.
More importantly, its officers were to carry out the first, albeit inadvertent, counter-intelligence operation that was to identify Cope's relationship with Sinn Fein and produce prima facia evidence of his willingness to leak confidential information to the insurgents. His activities were unmasked largely because of the paradox that lies at the heart of counter-intelligence: 'Although the purpose of counter-espionage is defensive, its methods are essentially offensive' . 52 Captain Robert Jeune, a member of the Special Branch, described the tactics used to counter the intelligence deficit: 'the work consisted of getting to know the town thoroughly, tailing the "Shinners", and carrying out the small raids, with a view to collecting all possible information which lead us eventually to stamping out the revolt' . 53 It was through this approach that Cope's activities first came to light:
In September 1920, a raid took place which had a significant result. It was decided to raid several houses in the Drumcondra area. Particular attention was paid to the house of a man called O'Connor, known to us as an active Sinn Feiner … There was no hostile reception, however, and the search went on. While this was happening I was standing talking to Boddington, who was in charge of the raid, when a letter was brought to him which he read and handed to me saying: 'Money for Jam' . It was on official Dublin Castle paper and was in these words:
Dear Mr O'Connor, I am having the papers you require sent up to you.
Yours sincerely A.W. Cope
This was distinctly interesting. Here was the Assistant Under Secretary writing to a notorious Sinn Feiner, with whom he had obviously already been in contact. After this I made a point of trying to find out more about this individual's doings, and found that he had done some rather strange things, such as arranging for some electricians of known Sinn Fein views to come into the Castle at unusual times. 54 Also he was one of the very few castle officials who could safely walk about the streets of Dublin. But it was decided that no drastic action could be taken against him, as it turned out he was a protégé of Lloyd George, who picked him out of Fisheries [ Pensions] and sent him over to Ireland under Sir John Anderson in order to get a foot in the Sinn Fein Camp.
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Within four months of his appointment, Cope was passing information, much of it secret, to Sinn Fein, and giving its members unauthorized access to Dublin Castle. His ability to do this was a consequence of how he had positioned himself in the Castle administrative structure. Sturgis's diary for 22 September 1920 gave a candid insight to this: 'He (Cope) has now taken over RIC transport and correspondence branch en bloc! I'm not sure he has not done his reorganisation Castle job (as nobody else could)' .
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Cope was now positioned to inject a damaging disconnect into the governance of Ireland.
In May 1920, the British government considered that the intelligence deficit required further augmentation. They appointed Brigadier-General Ormonde Winter as Deputy Chief of Police. This title was a cover for his role of Chief of the Combined Intelligence Services. Sturgis described him:
'O' is a marvel-he looks like a wicked little white snake and can do everything! When a soldier who knew him in India heard he was coming to Ireland he said 'God Help Sinn Fein, they don't know what they are up against' . 57 Winter made quick progress in gaining highly personalized information on the movements of Collins. By 3 September 1920, only four months after his arrival in Ireland, Sturgis revealed the extent of the inroads he had made:
'O' is on the track of Michael (Collins)-he was amusing about a report he wanted to send to the Under Secretary (Sir John Anderson) but couldn't as it would have said that Michael slept with a girl, address known, once a week, and this he shrank from dictating to his chaste female shorthand writer. So he had to give his news by word of mouth. 58 Curiously, no evidence can be found of this intelligence being actioned by Anderson. Winter's most important innovation was the setting up of two new intelligence organisations: the Central Office of Intelligence and the Central Raid Bureau and a number of supporting organisations. The first covered the whole of Ireland, and was divided into a number of sub structures. In The 'Intelligence Branch of the Chief of Police' , 59 Winter he gave an insight to these new organisations:
A Central Office was formed, through which all information should pass, be tabulated 60 and disseminated. Outside Police Centres were linked up to the Central Office by the formation of Local Intelligence Centres, which were responsible for collecting and passing on information between the Army and the Police, and formed the necessary branches of the main trunk. For convenience of control, these were situated at the Headquarters of Divisional Commissioners of the RIC. Police information was augmented, as far as possible, by the employment of chosen agents, and a Bureau was established in London, under special cover, to deal with all sources of information other than those obtained through ordinary channels, to collect information and pass it to the Central Bureau. 61 It is worth emphasizing the relative speed with which this structure was set up -in just six months. The first Local Intelligence Centre was functioning in Belfast by January 1921. Between March and April LICs were operational in Limerick, Kildare, Athlone, Galway, and Dundalk. The last one in Clonmel was functioning by July 1921. The greatest challenge was recruitment: 'The difficulty of obtaining and training suitable personnel somewhat retarded the formation of Local Centres, and the last one to be formed was only established at Clonmel a week before the Truce' .
62 There was also the security challenge linked to recruitment:
As a precautionary measure the personnel for the clerical services were all selected from individuals of English extraction, whose antecedents and activities were carefully screened by Scotland Yard. Nearly all the stenographers employed were women, and the male staff was all ex-officers of the Army or Navy. 63 Second was the Central Raid Bureau, which was functioning by October 1920. It enabled Courts Martial officers to gather evidence that could be used to prosecute members of the IRA, a point overlooked in the existing literature. 64 Organized searches provided accurate and timely intelligence:
It was mainly documentary evidence that enabled the authorities to obtain and hold, in the face of appeals, the vast number of internees, and led to the successful prosecution of many agitators. Endeavours were made to inculcate into all concerned the value of forwarding to the Central Bureau all documents captured in raids. 65 Raw intelligence was analyzed: 'Letters seized in one part of Ireland were often meaningless, but, when compared with documents, in a similar handwriting, captured elsewhere, either afforded valuable clues or led to the prosecution of the writer' . 66 'Collation' led to arrests of 'political criminals' and their subsequent internment or imprisonment, which in turn elicited more intelligence from suspects and led to the framing of charges or provided direction for further action.
The captured documents were recognized by General Macready as essential: 'Some of my people put the proportion of Intelligence so obtained as high as eighty per cent of the total information received' . 67 There was a two-part process: the recording, collating, analysing and assessing for necessary action all the documents that had been seized followed by the production and distribution of what were called epitomes 68 which provided the basis of actionable intelligence.
Epitomes provided a summary, or a quote that was judged to be of particular pertinence. They were a trigger mechanism whereby a military or police unit could call for the original document if they thought they would act as a basis for further action:
Some idea of the amount of work involved may be gathered from the fact that in the Dublin District area from October 1920 to July 1921, 6,311 raids and searches were carried out, and over 1200 epitomes of captured documents, some consisting of over 200 pages of foolscap were circulated. 69 The IRA could not avoid committing information to paper in the absence of any other medium or technology of communication, verbal communication being liable to corruption; yet written documents were vulnerable to capture. Winter believed that 'It was fortunate that the Irish had an irresistible habit of keeping records' .
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Alfred Cope and the leaders of the insurgency: the secrets of counter-intelligence
Winter's intelligence organizations provided counter-intelligence information. Furthermore, their operations challenged the teleological narrative of British incompetence and mendacity. Sturgis's diary entry for 16 November 1920 illustrated this point:
A raid last night on the house of the IRA 'Chief of Staff' called Mulcahy has been productive of some amazing stuff … the papers seized give evidence of the most thorough and complete plots to murder individuals, poison troops, horses etc.-to blow up the Manchester Ship Canal. 71 Evidence was recovered that led to IRA bank accounts: 'Wilson (Head of the Special Branch Dublin Military District) came in hot after Mulcahy's money -he also it seems has an account or accounts in the Bank at our gates in different names' .
72 IRA networks were now being uncovered and destroyed. Three days after the raid on Mulcahy's house, on 19th November, follow up organized searches were launched with a specific agenda: 'Among the Mulcahy's papers is a list of 200 gun men, names and addresses and classified as very good shots, good shots etc. We are out raiding tonight for these beauties and will have them on the run' 73 Six days later, on Sunday 21st November 1920, 12 intelligence and courts martial officers were murdered, and another five were wounded, some in front of their wives, in a series of co-ordinated attacks on civilian addresses and one hotel in the centre of Dublin. There is an extensive literature on this event. 'Bloody Sunday' was not the 'Napoleonic masterstroke' of Republican legend:
Rather than bringing relief, the shootings actually precipitated the worst setback yet for the rebels at the hands of British intelligence. Military and police intelligence officers had now identified most of their opponents. Raiding parties were unleashed all over Ireland to round up known IRA officers and activists and detention camps were hurriedly established to receive the large numbers of men caught in the net. Informers sprang up once again and arms were found in unprecedented numbers. 74 Hart's judgement is confirmed by a conversation that took place in January 1921 between Captain Jeune and General Boyd, GOC Dublin District. They both concurred that another six months would see the IRA unable to sustain the insurgency. 75 Jeune alluded to the forces that were to derail the progress that British intelligence and the security forces had made: 'by the early summer (1921) the IRA, were driven into the south west corner of Ireland, and would have been quickly finished. But certain influences were to save them' . 76 The nature of these 'certain influences' emerge from the epitomes compiled by the Central Raid Bureau. In a raid that took place on 16 : 'We have clearly demonstrated our willingness to have peace on honourable terms. Lloyd George insists on capitulation. Between these there is no mean' . 80 Cope searched for channels that he could both use and manipulate:
Irishmen in the Crown service were used as contacts by Cope in his secret efforts to bring about peace. Cope was in his element in these undercover activities but lacked the stability and perception to bring them to a successful conclusion. 82 These 'peace plots' as Sturgis referred to them continued in the midst of the insurgency. Nine days after the successful raid on McGrane's flat, which netted a treasure trove of captured documents, 83 the British government embarked on secret negotiations that drove a wedge between policy and strategy. 84 85 The communications between Republicans that preceded this meeting revealed their fear of being manipulated. In a letter to Art O'Brien 86 dated 5th January, Collins revealed his suspicions: 'To be plain about it Cope is lying. He must know that the Castle authorities made the approach to Fr O'F' . 87 Seeing a potential division among the insurgents, the British, in secret and at the highest level the government, were willing to negotiate amid a violent insurgency: 'Father O'Flanagan is ready to stump Ireland against the Republic, in favour of working the Home Rule Act plus "fiscal autonomy. "' 88 Sturgis confided the lengths they were prepared to go:
there is the feeling that many of them [Sinn Fein] are murders with whom we cannot treat … Still I can't deviate in my opinion that give these people a little now and they are to that extent men bribed, and men bribed are always a bit under one's thumb. 89 The extension of de facto legal immunity to de Valera encapsulated this. Macready has claimed that as soon as he arrived back in Ireland from the United States, in the first week of January 1921, he received instructions from Dublin Castle that de Valera was not to be interfered with or arrested. 90 He was wrong about the institutional source of this immunity. Sir John Anderson, the Under Secretary gave a more accurate indication to the Irish Situation Committee:
The fact that de Valera had been in or near Dublin for many months, the Irish Authorities had continually received information regarding meetings which De Valera attended personally in company of other rebels who were badly wanted. It had been impossible to raid these meetings in view of the Cabinet instructions … These restrictions had a hampering effect far beyond the immediate inhibitions imposed. 91 Anderson's statement underscored the accuracy of the intelligence the Irish authorities were receiving and the corrosive effect that cabinet level immunity was having on counter-insurgency measures. Edward Holt has asserted that Dublin Castle was appraised of de Valera's whereabouts during this period:
When de Valera was using a doctor's house in Merrion Square as his supposedly a secret hide-out and he was there summoned to the telephone by a voice which coolly asked: 'May I speak to Mr. de Valera? This is Alfred Cope, speaking from Dublin Castle' . 92 De Valera's immunity needs to be understood in the context of the relentless attacks being made on the police and army. Just two weeks after Sturgis's suggestion that the IRA, if treated with, could be converted into bribed men, the RIC continued to face a murderous onslaught:
During the early days of February [1921] , the RIC suffered severely in ambushes, the most disastrous of which took place at Dromkeen in Co Limerick on February 2nd, when two Crossleys 93 were ambushed and ten constables killed -all the wounded were dispatched in cold blood. 95 This reference by Collins indicated knowledge of the official post that Cope held.
At the end of March political changes emerged. Bonar Law's retirement from the Government meant that there was a greater flexibility in dealing with Sinn Fein. 96 As Sturgis recorded:
the PM is in a much more yielding mood and is prepared, not only to make big fiscal concessions but to take the initiative and say-of course after preliminary discussion into which the Ulster people will be brought -what price he is willing to pay for peace. 97 During this month British casualties continued to mount. In the third week there were 45 and in the last week of March there were 46. Despite these losses, intelligence was being exploited in a way that affected the IRA's ability to pace the insurgency. On 24th March a major arms dump was uncovered in Mountjoy Square. Then on 27th April in Baggot Lane an IRA provincial weapons distribution centre was uncovered. 98 On 29th April an organized search on Blackhall Place captured 40 insurgents. Collin's own offices, the first in Mespil Rd and then at 29 Mary Street had both been uncovered by the end of this month.
By May 1921 the government was committed to hold elections to the devolved Northern and Southern parliaments under the Government of Ireland Act. These elections saw Lloyd George willing to consider, 'the question of a truce during the elections in Ireland' . 99 This idea was rejected by the Cabinet and subsequently dropped. The quality of intelligence that was now being produced by organized searches was impressive. The Chief Secretary Hamar Greenwood, was exploiting it fully:
The Sinn Fein Army -I attach its latest muster roll [a captured document ]-is growing sullen, losing heavily and is certain to be defeated. A cessation now may mean its recovery … The position of the Crown Forces is stronger than it has ever been and is improving every day. The extremist leaders know this well and while they are prepared to fight on if there is no alternative. Cope continued to use Irishmen in Crown Service as a conduit for communications to Sinn Fein. In a letter from Seamus O'Concubair to de Valera dated 18th May, evidence is provided of his willingness to leak operational intelligence. In addition, he openly questioned a key element of government policy, the Government of Ireland Act: I went to see Lord Justice O'Connor on his invitation not knowing that Mr. Cope would be present. The latter impressed me as an able man, very adroit and pretending a full appreciation of, and some sympathy with our point of view. He stated that arrangements were already made for the withdrawal of the Auxiliary Forces, presumably as a preliminary to a truce … he believed a settlement within the Empire, whether as a Republic within the Empire or a Commonwealth or by whatever name it might be called, would of course, have to be preceded by the scrapping of the present Act. 102 He referred contemptuously to the North -East Parliament as a Parliament that has smaller powers than an English County Council. 103 Sinn Fein took an uncompromising approach to the elections of 26th May:
Dail Eireann had decided to use the British election machinery as a cheap and convenient way of electing the Second Dail, which would be a larger assembly since the Government of Ireland Act provided for a lower house in Southern Ireland of 128 members, as well as representation by 33 members in Westminster. 104 Sinn Fein was returned unopposed in all but the four seats which had been allocated to Trinity College Dublin. As General Macready commented to Anderson, most of those elected were 'leading gunmen and high officials in the IRA' . 105 This result did nothing to stop the insurgency or the casualties. From the beginning of May to the truce on 11th July, the RIC had 114 policemen killed and the British Army had 48 soldiers killed. 106 Sturgis expressed shock at the violence. Their lack of reciprocity was inexplicable to this upper class Englishman:
Yesterday [Sunday 22nd May] was uneventful save that these brutes took a poor devil they had wounded on Friday out of the Mater Hospital on a stretcher and shot him dead in the porch. If this is the sort of 'military operation' which is logical to expect to continue in spite of negotiations their mentality has me beat. 107 May saw an extension of the de facto legal immunity to other leaders of the insurgency. Erskine Childers, the Sinn Fein Director of Publicity, was arrested along with Frank Gallagher on 9th May 1921. Initially he was placed in an oubliette close to the Lower Castle Gate. In an edited version of subsequent events, Childers recounted his interaction with Cope:
To my immense astonishment I was called for in an hour, taken to an officers' sitting room and given a cup of tea. After a long wait in another room Alfred Cope came and told me I was to be released … The disgust of the officers at the whole business was amusing, but Cope was adamant … I left the Castle myself; Cope in his effusive manner and actually carrying my valise out of the gate for me! 108 Foy has claimed that Cope used this opportunity to leak to him documents for the Sinn Fein leadership. 109 The effectiveness of Winter's surveillance and research operation was underlined when the same papers were captured in an organized search and circulated by Winter to the relevant authorities in Dublin Castle. This was one of the few examples of Winter applying the third criteria of counterintelligence and attempting to neutralize Cope. Epitome No 5469 the document was seized at 22 Mary Street in Dublin on 26th May:
Erskine Childers to Minister of Finance (Collins) 16/5/21. Settlement outlined to me by Cope in the Castle a week ago was etc. He is probably a good actor, but his ostensible attitude was one of almost feverish anxiety to get something done and the business over. 110 The British intelligence community in Ireland now had clear evidence of Cope's willingness to hand over classified information which provided the IRA with an insight to government policy and intentions.
A truce with the IRA continued to be elusive. On 24th May, the Irish Situation Committee met to examine the implications of extending martial law throughout the whole of Southern Ireland and considered what measures would have to be made for Crown Colony Government. Paradoxically Winter received intelligence that indicated the IRA was having difficulty in sustaining their campaign: 'In May 1921, the IRA Commander in the south wrote to Collins to say that owing to the shortage of arms and ammunition, his men would be unable to continue much longer' . 111 The British government decided that if the devolved parliament in Dublin was not functioning within a fortnight of being summoned on the 28th June then the Viceroy would dissolve it and declare martial law throughout Ireland, except for Northern Ireland. Cope now had imposed on him a deadline of 14th July. With these pressures, Foy has claimed that Cope leaked the Irish Situation Committee's recommendations to the leaders of the insurgency. 112 A 'meaningful pattern' can be discerned in another epitome that the Raid Bureau put into circulation. It contained a message from Collins to de Valera dated 16 June 1921: 'Reference to interview "my man" who is very gloomy about the situation. Recites probable progress of events and foreshadows measures (correctly) to be taken if Martial law is enforced over the whole of Ireland' . 113 Although it is impossible to say who 'my man' was, 114 Cope's leaking of cabinet papers was the antithesis of a counter-insurgency strategy: 'politics becomes an active instrument of operations, and so intricate is the interplay between them the political and the military actions that they cannot be widely separated' . 115 The Army was by now cognisant of what Cope had been doing: incredulous of the rumours that the Government were actually negotiating secretly with the leaders of the murder gang, everybody threw themselves with still greater energy into the struggle, and the campaign against the rebel Flying Columns was further intensified in June. 116 If one event symbolized the dysfunctional approach of the government, it was the arrest of de Valera on 22nd June. He was captured in an organized search by the Worcester Regiment, and although he initially did not give his correct name, 117 he was found in possession of documents that linked him to an attack that had taken place on an army detachment seven days earlier:
de V is responsible for all acts of the IRA … Among his papers, when he was arrested last week (22/6/21) was the report, addressed to the President by the Minister of Defence on the train ambush near Dublin by the IRA against the R.W. Kent Regt (on the 16th June).
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Sturgis referred to the 'seditious documents' found in de Valera's possession when he was arrested. 119 The extent to which the Prime Minister was prepared to undermine the rule of law emerges from the Jeune papers:
Now Jeffries told me that the following took place. Army G.H.Q. at Kilmainham wired to his London office 'De Valera captured. Cope suggests release' … Jeffries took it to Lloyd George, who rubbed his hands together and said 'Well done the military. He must on no account be released' . Taking this as settled, Jeffries left, but as soon as he had gone Lloyd George send orders for De Valera to be released. 120 When Winter enquired as to who ordered his release, he was told by Lloyd George: 'It was not on my orders that he was released' . 121 Sturgis gave two further insights into this episode: first the inclination of policy makers to censor any media coverage of his arrest; second, Cope's intimate involvement: 'Andy got on to the CS and Jonathan this morning … they said de V was to be released at once and the fact that he was arrested at all was if possible to be kept out of the press' . 122 On 23rd June, the day of de Valera's release, the Prime Minister summoned his key advisers for the following day to a cabinet meeting in London. Cope, although not invited, managed to gain access to the meeting due to the influence of Lady Greenwood. Sturgis nicknamed the meeting 'the Andy Cabinet' . Cope had the opportunity to address the cabinet meeting. His political bias towards the insurgents resulted in a rebuke from his own Chief Secretary: 'Andy harangued His Majesty's Ministers … he talked failure without an offer and Greenwood told him "to curb his Sinn Fein tendencies. "' 123 The result was a personal letter from the Prime Minister to de Valera inviting him to meet him in London. 124 Cope delivered this letter on 25 June 1921.
On the same day, one of the most important secret agents in the upper echelons of Sinn Fein filed a report to Sir Basil Thompson, then Director of Intelligence in the Home Office. Foy has claimed that the identity of this agent was Molly Childers, the wife of Erskine Childers. 125 She had access to the leadership of Sinn Fein, including both de Valera and Collins. She commented on de Valera's political attitudes: 'I have frequently told you that De Valera, what -ever may be said to the contrary, is a red hot extremist' .
126 She had no illusions about the bankruptcy of negotiation and on whom the costs of this policy would fall:
I must again emphasize what I have repeated time after time. Any thought of compromise or conciliation with SF is absolutely unthinkable and moreover is impossible; you are frittering away the lives of valuable and gallant servants of the Crown.
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She identified the absence of the one thing that Cope and his colleagues assumed in the leaders of Sinn Fein: a sense of reciprocity: 'In our attempts at conciliation they see only weakness and signs that they are forcing the Government to its knees, to grant them any damn thing they want ' . 128 This report illuminated three things: Cope's secret contacts and negotiations with the leaders of Sinn Fein were being reported on by Thompson's [sic] agent; second, his efforts were regarded as nugatory in terms of their utility; third, it underlined the significance of captured IRA documents as a source of intelligence:
I told you how negotiations carried on by Cope of the Castle had been scoffed at and ridiculed. They say there that he was primarily responsible for D.V.s release, and that Boyd [GOC Dublin District] was all for keeping him. Is this true? The Shinners have a great wind up over some documents their August President had on him at the time of his arrest. Was anything valuable captured? 129 Her motivation as a spy was declining. She made clear the dangers and the consequences for her if found out: 'you know why I took this job on, not for cash but to feel that I was really doing something to help … I wouldn't get 10 minutes grace if they had the slightest suspicion …' 130 This intelligence report was passed to Lloyd George by Hamar Greenwood on 29th June. In the covering note to his secretary and mistress 131 Greenwood characterized its importance in the following manner: Lloyd George's letter of 25th June led to a meeting in Dublin's Mansion House on 8th July. General Macready, the GOC, met de Valera and other leaders of the insurgency to agree to terms of a truce. This came into effect at 12 noon on 11th July. It was preceded by: 'one of the bloodiest weekends of the conflict, with the IRA killing some 20 people in 36 hours' . 136 Even Sturgis admitted to his diary that 'they killed right up to the Armistice' .
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After the truce
From October to December 1921 Cope was in London. 138 Between August 1921 and March 1924 several sources gave us details of Cope's activities both before and after the Truce. The first source was army reports. In August 1921 General Strickland sent the following message to army GHQ in Dublin:
The motor car restrictions are a farce. Republican leaders move freely without passes in stolen cars, a case occurred of a DIV Commander IRA being arrested for this offence by the RIC. His immediate release was ordered on the telephone by an Under-Secretary at Dublin Castle 139 In another confidential memo sent by the Colonel Commandant of the 17th Infantry Brigade to General Strickland's 6th Divisional Headquarters a similar pattern of undermining the rule of law can be seen:
He [Cope] said that instructions would be sent for the car which the Essex Regiment took from the rebels to be handed back to the IRA. … it is difficult to know how its return to the rebels can be reconciled with any sense of justice and fair play. 140 What these senior army officers did not know is that in the same month Cope had written to Tom Jones 141 ensure that the Army was instructed to ignore breaches in the terms of the Truce:
I hope that the Military people here have clear instructions from the PM to do nothing in the way of rounding up Sinn Fein Courts or drilling and if we fail to stop these amicably with Sinn Fein, to wink at them during the present critical period. 142 The second source was the House of Commons. An answer was provided to the question posed by Captain Jeune in September 1920. Why was Cope one of the very few British officials who could walk safely about the streets of Dublin? 143 The Unionist MP for Belfast Woodvale, Robert Lynn 144 asked the Chief Secretary: 'whether any high official in Dublin Castle was supplied with a safe permit or pass by the Irish republican army or Sinn Fein, and under what conditions it was issued' . 145 Greenwood refuted the first part of the question and then claimed that the second part did not arise. Lynn then responded with a supplementary question: 'How is it that Mr. Cope was able to go about Dublin?' 146 Greenwood's feeble riposte was to describe Cope as a 'plucky servant of the Crown' . A more serious allegation was made by Lynn:
whether key ciphers and confidential information regarding important matters in Ireland have been communicated by high officials in Dublin Castle to Sinn Fein Leaders; whether careful investigations have revealed the fact that not more than three officials could have been responsible for betraying the Government secrets 147 Cope's responsibility for the transport and communications branch of the RIC, made him a prime suspect. His final question to Greenwood revealed the consequences of Cope's actions: 'whether it is a fact that on several occasions when the police have made searches they have found the secret key cypher before it has been communicated to the county inspector?' 148 The Chief Secretary maintained that he had no knowledge of these facts. Lynn responded that he had. On his arrival at the castle he took advantage of his official position to attend meetings held by heads of Departments to consider the best means of putting down these outrages and of restoring law and order. Having obtained full information, he at once proceeded to convey that information to the leaders of the Sinn Fein organisation, with the result that these plans devised by His Majesty's officers came to naught and in many cases His Majesty's officers and men lost their lives. The result of this treachery at headquarters was to paralyse the efforts of His Majesty's officials, and crime and outrage were rampant throughout the country. 153 He challenged Lord Muskerry to substantiate the charges he had made on the floor of the House of Lords, or to repeat them outside the House and let the law take its course. Lord Muskerry's response was to protect his sources: 'I had the news from friends whom I knew, and who were in a position to speak, and it is their statement that I made' . 154 In the two weeks between his initial statement in the House of Lords and this subsequent debate Lord Muskerry added weight to his allegations by citing corroborating evidence: 'Since that debate I have received a number of letters from officers and ex-officers of the Royal Irish Constabulary who were in Dublin at the time, and they make the same statement' .
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This Irish peer suggested that the government set up a committee with the power to investigate Cope's actions and take evidence as to what happened between 1919 and 1921. This proposal was rejected by the Lord Chancellor: 'The Government are thoroughly satisfied that no case has been shown to make Sir Alfred Cope deserving of reproach' .
156 It was also claimed that he had acted with the full knowledge of the Chief Secretary and the Under Secretary. The Lord Chancellor was supported by Lord Curzon who demanded that Lord Muskerry withdraw his original statement. This he was forced to do.
157
Conclusions
The concepts of counter-intelligence have illuminated Cope's behaviour and provide answers to two questions. First, the extent he systematically passed confidential and secret information to the leaders of the insurgency? Second, did he facilitate the granting of a progressive de facto legal immunity to the leadership of Sinn Fein?
With respect to the former question, evidence suggests that Cope within months of taking up his post was passing confidential and secret information to Sinn Fein. There are unsubstantiated and indirect allegations made by former members of the RIC that lives were lost because of his actions. He undermined the rule of law in favour of what he interpreted as political expediency. What was his motivation? Any answer to this question will be speculative. Not surprisingly Cope left no private papers. When Cope arrived in Ireland his political bias, self-government for Ireland, was already formed as General Macready has indicated. 158 Finally, this posting gave him a career opportunity. In 1920s Britain, Cope was a social outsider in comparison to his peers. W.E. Wylie, the law adviser in Dublin Castle, asked Sturgis how it was that he, Anderson and Cope had arrived together in such high positions. Sturgis responded with a metaphor which summarized the social differences: 'Anderson came in through the front door, Cope via the back door and himself through the drawing-room window' .
159
Sturgis described Cope as 'a most interesting unique creature and was at one time an Excise Detective' . In one sense Cope's background was an advantage. He could mix with the predominantly working class and lower middle class leaders of Sinn Fein. Sturgis, with his Eton and Oxford background, would have been unable and unwilling to do so. Cope rejected the restrictions that applied to other senior civil servants. For Sturgis this boiled over a month after the Truce in August 1921. At the Royal Dublin Horseshow Cope avoided the Royal box where most of the senior Castle officials gathered. Instead he flaunted relationships that had until very recently been kept secret, he goes 'down the drain' not only for business but for pleasure, spends most of his evenings with Shinns of various sorts and seems to dislike all other society. They remember, if he seems to forget sometimes, that he is a highly placed British official with much of the dignity of England in his hands and I worry sometimes that his sympathy will encourage them to think they can get through him all they ask. 160 In answer to the second question there is a paradox. The decision to grant de facto legal immunity to de Valera and its progressive extension was not something that was in Cope's gift. As Sir John Anderson had indicated, it was a cabinet level decision. Cope merely extended it when he judged it appropriate. However, there is one dimension of his relations with the government that remains an enigma -his relationship with Lloyd George. Sturgis suggested in his diary that the Prime Minister preferred a 'bad bargain in five minutes rather than a good one in two hours' . Cope's treasonable acts were, probably, protected at a highest level of government.
It has not been possible to locate evidence of direct communication between Cope and Lloyd George. Yet there is evidence of the Prime Minister's unease, three months before the Truce, at Cope's behaviour in the diaries of Thomas Jones 161 
:
If a truce can be arranged, I[Lloyd George] am for it but I think the various offers made to them give them the idea that we are on the run. All that is said favourable to Sinn Fein is published at great length. Some suggestions I wish had not been made, by officials of the Castle. 162 In the same month that he finally left Ireland, October 1922, he was knighted and became Sir Alfred Cope -an honour conferred on him by Lloyd George. Ironically he never held another post in the civil service. From 1923 to 1925 he occupied the post of secretary of the National Liberal Party. Yet the politician he had served from afar brought fresh problems for Cope: 'he found close co-operation with Lloyd George impossible, and abandoned politics altogether' . 163 What remains indisputable is that Cope's secret relationship with the leaders of the insurgency contributed directly to a decision by the government to agree to a truce in July 1921. Confirmation is provided by Sturgis: 'Lady Greenwood asked me this morning in mockery -'Who has made the Truce -Smuts or the Viceroy'? 'Neither 'says I, 'but one Cope' . 164 A rare retrospective assessment of the consequences of the willingness to treat with the leaders of an insurgency comes from Cope himself. In 1951, three years before his death, he was invited by the Private Secretary of the Irish ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mr. Dulanty to participate in an oral history project. This programme was called the Bureau of Military History. 165 It had been established in January 1947 by the Irish Minister of Defence, Oscar Traynor. 166 In Cope's letter of refusal a sense of both justification and remorse about the events he helped shape can be discerned:
Over the years I have had offers from various sources for my views and experiences but have turned then all down because I regard the period (and also that following the Treaty) to be the most discreditable of your country's history-it is preferable to forget it: to let sleeping dogs lie. 167 Secondly, he expressed regret about the accepted judgement he had done so much to construct:
The I.R.A. must be shown as national heroes and the British Forces as brutal oppressors. Accordingly, The Truce and the Treaty will have been brought about by the valour of small and ill-equipped groups of irregulars. And so on. What a travesty it will be and must be. 168 Cope also acknowledged he had created a self sustaining and destructive narrative: 'Read by future generations of Irish children, it will simply perpetuate the long standing hatred of England and continue the work of self-seeking politicians' . 169 . Events in Ireland between 1919 and 1922 are still set within this judgement: 'The dominant narrative remains that of the nationalist movement in conflict with British rule' . 170 The prism of counter-intelligence has enabled an important question that was raised at the beginning of this article to be addressed; how effective were the intelligence organisations established from June 1920 onwards? 171 Kent identified two functions that were vital to counter-intelligence: surveillance and research. Winter in his final report provided an insight to how they related to the campaign that he had just fought. The most contentious issue with respect to surveillance and research was the duplication of effort between the army and the police. Winter argued that this was a price worth paying to maintain efficiency, and that the Local Intelligence Centres were in the process of resolving this issue.
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He took a more nuanced approach, at the operational level, to the primacy of the RIC and their Special Branch than he has been given credit for 173 : 'The psychology of the Crimes Special Sergeant had to be taken into consideration. He was an Irishman, and even to Police Officers of long service, his confidence was given with circumspection' . 174 Winter understood that intelligence was not a panacea: 'Intelligence alone cannot win a war. It is merely an aid to force, and it is only by action that the desired end can be attained' . 175 He claimed that the British government used a degree of 'coercion which was not sufficiently severe' . Although he believed that they nearly succeeded. He understood the cardinal weakness in the campaign and related it back to the leading theorist of war: 'The great Clausewitz said "All kinds of philanthropy in war are a gross and pernicious error. "' 176 It was symbolized by an assumption that a 'business-like conduct' of negotiating with insurgents would produce a just and equitable outcome.
Despite this preference, British intelligence succeeded in two respects: at a tactical level it identified the insurgents and produced exploitable intelligence. This challenged the ability of the IRA to pace the insurgency. At the operational level intelligence enabled the IRA's organisational networks to be penetrated and subverted. The concepts of counter-intelligence help us understand how Cope was able to undermine this counter-insurgency campaign. His activities provide a hitherto under researched context for any judgement about the effectiveness of British intelligence in Ireland. An agenda for future research could be a comparative analysis of the role of Cope and counter-intelligence in Ireland after 1920 and the role of the Security Service in the secret negotiations that preceded the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.
Notes
